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¶1 Throughout U.S. history, the constitutional and statutory standard for patent 
eligible subject matter has been sufficiently flexible to adapt to new technological 
innovations.  For example, during the Industrial Revolution, the Supreme Court in 
Cochrane v. Deener1 held that an improved method for manufacturing flour was 
patentable.  At the dawn of the Information Age, the Supreme Court held that a claim 
directed to a chemical process which included a programmed digital computer was 
patentable,  and the Court’s decision in Diamond v. Chakrabarty,2 3 which approved the 
patenting of a new life form, a microbe capable of digesting petrochemicals, has been 
credited with advancing the modern era of biotechnology. 
¶2 As a general matter, a robust notion of patentable subject matter best serves the 
United States in the twenty-first century.  Within our innovation-driven economy, diverse 
industries have contributed numerous technical advances that are unquestionably suitable 
for patenting.  The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) has, for example, 
appropriately awarded patents in the pharmaceutical, biotechnology, computer/ 
electronics, biomedical, financial, mechanical and other important fields. 
¶3 Since the Supreme Court last decided an issue of patent eligibility,4 however, 
certain decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit have broadened the 
scope of subject matter deemed eligible for patenting, particularly in the area of business 
methods.  Under the standard currently followed by the Federal Circuit, an invention is 
eligible for patenting if it merely achieves “a useful, concrete, and tangible result.”5  This 
lenient standard has converted the patent eligibility inquiry into an “end justifies the 
means” approach, resulting in patents arising from a diverse range of human behavior 
traditionally outside the realm of patent protection.  Areas of endeavor deemed patentable 
under this lenient standard include, economic analyses,  artistic techniques,  athletic 6 7
 
* Vice President and Assistant General Counsel Intellectual Property Law, IBM.  I acknowledge with 
gratitude the assistance of Paik Saber, Assistant General Counsel, Intellectual Property Law, IBM Asia 
Pacific, and Christopher A. Hughes, Partner Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP. 
** Professor of Law, Georgetown University. 
*** Intellectual Property Law Attorney, IBM. 
1 Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 781, 791 (1877). 
2 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191-93 (1981). 
3 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 318 (1980). 
4 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191-93. 
5 State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
6 Method for Simultaneously Improving Educ., Econ., Ecological, Envtl., & Other Processes Vital to 
Comtys., U.S. Pat. No. 7,260,559 (filed Feb. 25, 2003). 
7 Painting Kit & Related Method, U.S. Pat. No. 6,213,778 (filed Dec. 14, 1999) (a method of painting a 
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skills,  and abstract methods of doing business.8 9  As one Federal Circuit jurist remarked, 
under that court’s case law, “virtually anything is patentable.”  10
¶4 The Federal Circuit’s permissive patentability standard stands at odds with the 
Constitution and the Supreme Court’s consistent statements that an invention must 
contribute to the “Progress of [the] . . . useful Arts” in order to be eligible for patenting.  
In that constitutional context, patentable advances must be tied to a particular machine or 
apparatus, or alternatively, must reside in the physical transformation of an article to a 
“different state or thing.”11  Although a more recent Federal Circuit opinion has 
recognized that “the use of human intelligence in and of itself” is not patentable even 
where a practical result is achieved,12 the Federal Circuit continues to hold that inventions 
that do not produce technologically useful results may be patented.13  This standard fails 
to apply an important constraint upon the patent system without any doctrinal 
justification or alternative tempering principle. 
¶5 This article makes the case that the technological contribution requirement for 
patentable subject matter should be restored.  In Part I, this article reviews the extensive 
body of Supreme Court precedent governing patent eligibility.  From this body of case 
law, we assert that the gravamen of the Supreme Court’s precedent is that subject matter 
patentability is restricted to inventions that involve technological contributions, namely, 
tangible products or processes that are either (i) tied to a particular machine or apparatus 
or (ii) cause transformation or reduction of an article to a different state or thing, and in 
either instance produce technologically beneficial results. 
¶6 Part II of this article considers conflicting developments at the Federal Circuit.  In 
State Street Bank14 and other opinions, the Federal Circuit has equated patentability to 
mere usefulness.  This lenient “end justifies the means” standard renders all human 
endeavors subject to patenting.  Although the recently issued panel decisions In re 
Comiskey  and In re Nuijten15 16 have attempted to define some important restrictions upon 
the lenient patentability standard that was first articulated in State Street Bank, these 
decisions continue to allow patents to be granted on inventions that do not produce 
technologically useful results.  Part II further explains how the Federal Circuit 
accomplished its shift in patent policy without any evidence suggesting that incentives 
are needed for innovation with respect to abstract business methods and other non-
technological innovations, and without due consideration of the impact of such a shift 
upon the economy. 
¶7 In Part III, this article asserts that the long-standing principles governing subject 
matter eligible for patenting should be maintained.  Although no persuasive justification 
prompted the abrupt allowance, indeed explosion, of patents for business methods, the 
 
surface using the posterior of an infant). 
8 Method of Putting, U.S. Pat. No. 5,616,089 (filed Mar. 29, 1996). 
9 Strategic Capability Networks, U.S. Pat. No. 6,249,768 (filed Oct. 29, 1998). 
10 Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 148 F.3d 1385, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Clevenger, J., dissenting) 
(citing State St., 149 F.3d 1368).  
11 See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70-71 (1972). 
12 In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
13 Id. at 1379-80. 
14 State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
15 In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d at 1365. 
16 In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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breadth of coverage of such patents has raised important concerns.  Among them are 
concerns that such patents are not restricted to a specific technological contribution, and 
therefore, may effectively appropriate all conceivable solutions to a particular problem.  
Such an overbroad monopoly thwarts progress of the useful arts by precluding legitimate 
attempts to design around a patent and by providing unjustified rewards beyond the 
contribution of the inventor.  Part IV of this article concludes that, consistent with 
Supreme Court precedent on patent eligibility, a technological contribution should be 
required for subject matter patentability. 
I.  THE CONSTITUTION AND THE SUPREME COURT’S PRECEDENT ESTABLISH LIMITS UPON 
THE SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBLE FOR PATENTING  
A. Formative Principles 
¶8 The Constitution speaks to the sorts of inventions that are appropriately patented.  
It provides:  
The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.17
¶9 Historical context confirms that the Constitution restricts the scope of patent 
eligible subject matter.  For example, the English Statute of Monopolies of 1623, upon 
which the U.S. patent system is largely based, provided an exception to the general 
prohibition against monopolies by granting a “privilege for the term of fourteen years or 
under [for] the sole working or making any manner of new manufactures . . . to the . . . 
inventor . . . . ”18  Notably, that Statute eliminated commercial practices from the scope of 
patentable exclusivity: 
[T]hose who formulated the Constitution were familiar with the long struggle 
over monopolies so prominent in English history, where exclusive rights to 
engage even in ordinary business activities were granted so frequently by the 
Crown for the financial benefits accruing to the Crown only.  It was desired that 
in this country any Government grant of a monopoly for even a limited time 
should be limited to those things which serve in the promotion of science and the 
useful arts.19
Contemporaneous use of the term “useful arts” by the Founding Fathers further confirms 
that patent eligible subject matter was limited to technological or industrial innovations.  
The term “useful arts” was used in the context of the production of goods and the 
industrial, mechanical, and manual arts by a delegate to that Convention just days before 
 
17 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 294 (James Madison) (M. Walter 
Dunne ed., 1901) (“The right to useful inventions . . . belong[s] to the inventors.”). 
18 Statute of Monopolies, 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c.3 (Eng.), reprinted in 9 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON 
PATENTS, App. 8-3 (2005). 
19 In re Yuan, 188 F.2d 377, 380 (C.C.P.A. 1951) (emphasis added). 
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the Constitutional Convention of 1787.20  Likewise, Alexander Hamilton praised the 
patent system as a way of encouraging manufacturing industries and “[inventions] which 
relate to machinery” in the United States.21
¶10 Consistent with the constitutional foundation, the current patent statute, 35 U.S.C.  
§ 101, provides: 
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement 
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements 
of this title. 
The Supreme Court has long held that the first three categories enumerated in § 101 — 
machines, manufactures and compositions of matter — refer to physical products.  The 
Supreme Court has defined the term “machine” in § 101 to mean “a concrete thing, 
consisting of parts, or of certain devices and combination of devices.”22  The term 
“manufacture” in § 101 means “the production of articles for use from raw or prepared 
materials by giving to these materials new forms, qualities, properties, or combinations, 
whether by hand-labor or by machinery;”23 and the phrase “composition of matter” has 
been defined to mean “all compositions of two or more substances and . . . all composite 
articles, whether they be the results of chemical union, or of mechanical mixture, or 
whether they be gases, fluids, powders or solids.”24
¶11 The fourth § 101 category, “process”, is defined in the patent statute as: “process, 
art or method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture, 
composition of matter, or material.”  25
¶12 Although the meanings of the terms “process, art or method” are broad on their 
face, the Supreme Court’s precedent “forecloses a purely literal reading of § 101.”   In 26
 
20 The delegate gave examples of the “useful arts”: 
Under all the disadvantages which have attended manufactures and the useful arts, it 
must afford the most comfortable reflection to every patriotic mind to observe their 
progress in the United States and particularly in Pennsylvania. . . .  Permit me however to 
mention them under their general heads: meal of all kinds, ships and boats, malt and 
distilled liquors, potash, gunpowder, cordage, loaf-sugar, pasteboard, cards and paper of 
every kind, books in various languages, snuff, tobacco, starch, cannon, musquets, 
anchors, nails, and very many other articles of iron, bricks, tiles, potters ware, mill-
stones, and other stone work, cabinet work, trunks and Windsor chairs, carriages and 
harness of all kinds . . . . 
TENCH COXE, AN ADDRESS TO AN ASSEMBLY OF THE FRIENDS OF AMERICAN MANUFACTURES, 17-18 
(Philadelphia, R. Aitkin & Son 1787) (emphasis added); see also JOSEPH BARNES, TREATISE ON THE 
JUSTICE, POLICY, AND UTILITY OF ESTABLISHING AN EFFECTUAL SYSTEM FOR PROMOTING THE PROGRESS 
OF USEFUL ARTS 4 (Francis Bailey 1792) (Patentable invention “consists in discoveries in science, and in 
the useful arts; by means of which agriculture, navigation, manufactures, and manual labor are, not only 
facilitated, but much promoted; and, indeed, to these they owe their present state of perfection.”). 
21 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE REPORTS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON: REPORT ON MANUFACTURES (Dec. 
5, 1791) 115-16, 175-76 (Jacob E. Cooke ed., Harper & Row 1964). 
22 Burr v. Duryee, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 531, 570 (1864). 
23 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980). 
24 Id. 
25 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (2006). 
26 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 589 (1978); see also Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 183 (1981) (“A 
process is a mode of treatment of certain materials to produce a given result. It is an act, or a series of acts, 
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particular, the Supreme Court has consistently distinguished between concrete, specific 
and technologically-grounded aspects of innovative contributions, which are protectable 
via the patent system, from underlying abstract or general principles, which are not. 
¶13 In an early landmark decision regarding patentable subject matter, O’Reilly v. 
Morse,  the Supreme Court revoked Morse’s 8th claim, which recited: 27
I do not propose to limit myself to the specific machinery or parts of machinery 
described in the foregoing specification and claims; the essence of my invention 
being the use of the motive power of the electric or galvanic current, which I call 
electro-magnetism, however developed for marking or printing intelligible 
characters, signs, or letters, at any distances, being a new application of that 
power of which I claim to be the first inventor or discoverer.28
The Supreme Court reasoned that the claim was “not warranted by law” because it would 
protect, and thereby prevent use of, all conceivable solutions to accomplish the recited 
result.29
If this claim can be maintained, it matters not by what process or machinery the 
result is accomplished.  For aught that we now know some future inventor, in the 
onward march of science, may discover a mode of writing or printing at a 
distance by means of the electric or galvanic current, without using any part of 
the process or combination set forth in the plaintiff’s specification. . . .  But yet if 
it is covered by this patent the inventor could not use it, nor the public have the 
benefit of it without the permission of this patentee.30
¶14 The Court explained that Morse was only entitled to a patent for the method of 
using electro-magnetism to print marks or signs at a distance that he actually invented: 
“he has not discovered that the electromagnetic current, used as a motive power, in any 
other method, and with any other combination, will do as well.”  31
¶15 Twenty years later, in Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard,32 the Supreme Court 
invalidated a claim reciting a rubber eraser having a hole to accept a pencil.  The Court 
acknowledged that the idea of a pencil combined with a rubber eraser was a good one, 
but considered that its implementation so readily followed from the idea that it could not 
be patented.  In striking down the patent, the Court explained that “an idea of itself is not 
patentable, but a new device by which it may be made practically useful is.”  33
¶16 O’Reilly and Rubber-Tip Pencil are bedrock cases for determining patent 
eligibility.  Both opinions confirm that the patent system does not protect all types of 
processes nor does it protect abstract ideas.  These cases also reinforce the important 
policy goal of maintaining “basic tools of scientific and technological work” within the 
 
performed upon the subject-matter to be transformed and reduced to a different state or thing.”). 
27 O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1854). 
28 Id. at 112 (emphasis added). 
29 Id. at 113. 
30 Id. at 112-13. 
31 Id. at 117 (emphasis added). 
32 Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498 (1874). 
33 Id. at 507. 
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public domain.34  O’Reilly in particular makes it clear that process patents should not be 
allowed to appropriate all solutions to a problem.  The Supreme Court has consistently 
applied the fundamental principles announced in O’Reilly and Rubber-Tip Pencil in the 
intervening years. 
B. Modern Supreme Court Cases 
¶17 Notably, in a trilogy of cases decided at the dawn of the Information Age, the 
Supreme Court considered computer-related inventions and confirmed its early precedent 
as applied to new fields of endeavor.  In Gottschalk v. Benson,35 the Court considered 
whether a claimed “method for converting binary-coded decimal (BCD) numerals into 
pure binary numerals” was eligible for patenting.  The Court observed that the claimed 
method was not limited to any particular apparatus, context, or use.  Rather, the claims 
“purported to cover any use of the claimed method in a general-purpose digital computer 
of any type.”  36
¶18 The Gottschalk Court concluded that the claimed method was not patentable.37  
Much as “one may not patent an idea,” the Supreme Court explained, one may not patent 
the “formula for converting BCD numerals to pure binary numerals.”38  Observing that 
“the mathematical formula involved here has no substantial practical application except 
in connection with a digital computer,” the Court explained that an issued patent 
including the claims-at-issue “would wholly pre-empt the mathematical formula and in 
practical effect would be a patent on the algorithm itself.”39  In reaching its decision, the 
Supreme Court acknowledged that the “[t]ransformation and reduction of an article ‘to a 
different state or thing’ is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not 
include particular machines.”  40
¶19 Parker v. Flook, the second case, involved claims drawn to a method for computing 
an “alarm limit” on any process variable involved in the catalytic chemical conversion of 
hydrocarbons.41  When a process variable, such as temperature, pressure, or flow rate, 
exceeded a predetermined “alarm limit,” an alarm signaled “an abnormal condition 
indicating either inefficiency or perhaps danger.”42  The only difference between the 
claimed method and conventional methods was the mathematical algorithm or formula 
used to calculate the alarm limit.  43
¶20 The Supreme Court held that the claim was ineligible for patenting because it 
simply provided a formula for computing an updated alarm limit.44  The application did 
not explain how to “select the appropriate margin of safety, the weighing factor, or any 
 
34 See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). 
35 Id. at 64. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 71-73. 
38 Id. at 71.  
39 Id. at 71-72. 
40 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972). See, e.g., Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U.S. 
366, 385-86 (1909) (sustaining a patent on a process for expanding metal that involved mechanical 
operations). 
41 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 585 (1978). 
42 Id. 
43 Id. at 585-86. 
44 Id. at 594-96. 
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other variables. . . .  Nor [did] it . . . contain any disclosure relating to the chemical 
processes at work, the monitoring of process variables, or the means of setting off an 
alarm or adjusting an alarm system.”  45
¶21 In accordance with the Gottschalk decision, the Supreme Court in Parker 
confirmed that a process does not automatically fall within the patentable subject matter 
of § 101 merely because a process implements a principle or mathematical formula in 
some specific fashion.46  To permit otherwise “would make the determination of 
patentable subject matter depend simply on the draftsman’s art and would ill serve the 
principles underlying the prohibition against patents for ‘ideas’ or phenomena of 
nature.”47  Justice Stevens took pains to note that the “rule that the discovery of a law of 
nature cannot be patented rests, not on the notion that natural phenomena are not 
processes, but rather on the more fundamental understanding that they are not the kind of 
‘discoveries’ that the statute was enacted to protect.”48  Justice Stevens further explained 
that an inventive application of a mathematical formula, principle or phenomenon of 
nature may be patented, but only if “there is some other inventive concept in its 
application.”  49
¶22 The Court further explained that “post-solution activity” — the adjustment of the 
alarm limit to the figure computed according to the formula — cannot “transform an 
unpatentable principle into a patentable process.”50  Justice Stevens appreciated that a 
skilled patent drafter could “attach some form of post-solution activity to almost any 
mathematical formula.”51  Yet “the concept of patentable subject matter under § 101 is 
not ‘like a nose of wax which may be turned and twisted in any direction . . . .’”  52
¶23 In the last case, Diamond v. Diehr, the invention was “a process for molding raw, 
uncured synthetic rubber into cured precision products.”53  According to the patent, the 
industry had been unable “to obtain uniformly accurate cures because the temperature of 
the molding press could not be precisely measured, thus making it difficult to . . . 
determine cure time.”54  To overcome this problem, the method required, among other 
things, constantly measuring the actual temperature inside the mold and then 
automatically feeding the temperature measurements into a computer that would 
repeatedly recalculate the cure time by use of a well-known equation.  55
¶24 The Supreme Court held the claims to be patentable because “a physical and 
chemical process for molding precision synthetic rubber products falls within the § 101 
categories of possibly patentable subject matter.”56  Here, the “claims were not directed 
to a mathematical algorithm or an improved method of calculation but rather recited an 
improved process for molding rubber articles by solving a practical problem which had 
 
45 Id. at 586. 
46 Id. at 593. 
47 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 593 (1978). 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 594. 
50 Id. at 590. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. (quoting White v. Dunbar, 119 U.S. 47, 51 (1886)).  
53 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 177 (1981). 
54 Id. at 178. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 184. 
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arisen in the molding of rubber products.”57  Justice Rehnquist appreciated that 
“[i]ndustrial processes such as this [sic] are the types which have historically been 
eligible to receive the protection of our patent laws.”  58
¶25 The Supreme Court further stated that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise 
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula, 
computer program, or digital computer.”59  Rather, “when a claim containing a 
mathematical formula implements or applies that formula in a structure or process which, 
when considered as a whole, is performing a function which the patent laws were 
designed to protect (e.g., transforming or reducing an article to a different state or thing), 
then the claim satisfies the requirements of § 101.”60  On the other hand, “laws of nature, 
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are excluded from patent protection.61  Scientific 
truths, or the mathematical expression of them, are similarly outside the patent system, 
but “a novel and useful structure created with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth may 
be [patentable].”  62
¶26 In these and other relevant patent cases, the Supreme Court has developed several 
cogent principles that constrain subject matter patentability: 
(1) “Excluded from . . . patent protection are laws of nature, natural phenomena, 
and abstract ideas.”  63
(2) “A principle, in the abstract, is a fundamental truth; an original cause; a 
motive; these cannot be patented, as no one can claim in either of them an 
exclusive right.”  64
(3) One may not patent an idea.  65
(4) “Phenomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract 
intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of 
scientific and technological work.”  66
(5) Mathematical algorithms are not patentable.  67
(6) One cannot patent all solutions to a problem.  68
(7) “It is for the discovery or invention of some practical method or means of 
producing a beneficial result or effect, that a patent is granted, and not for the 
result or effect itself.”  69
(8) Insignificant post-solution activity or limiting an abstract idea to one 
technological environment will not render an abstract idea patentable.  70
 
57 Id. at 181. 
58 Id. at 184. 
59 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981). 
60 Id. at 192. 
61 Id. at 185. 
62 Id. at 188 (quoting Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939)). 
63 Id. at 185. 
64 Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 156, 175 (1852). 
65 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972) (quoting Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 
Wall.) 498, 507 (1874)). 
66 Id. 
67 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 186 (1981); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 586 (1978); 
Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 71-72. 
68 See O’Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62, 113 (1853). 
69 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 252, 267-68 (1853)). 
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(9) “A claim covers and secures a process, a machine, a manufacture, a 
composition of matter, or a design, but never the function or result of either, 
nor the scientific explanation of their operation.”  71
¶27 Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of patent eligibility in a 
generation, its grant of certiorari in Laboratory Corp. of America v. Metabolite Labs., 
Inc. potentially suggests its renewed interest.72  Given that the Federal Circuit decision 
under review included no discussion of § 101 whatsoever,73 LabCorp was a rather 
unlikely candidate for discussion of the statutory subject matter issue.  Ultimately this 
deficiency contributed to the Supreme Court’s disposition of the case by dismissing the 
writ of certiorari as improvidently granted just three months later.  74
¶28 Metabolite Laboratories is the proprietor of U.S. Patent No. 4,940,658 (’658 
patent), which is directed to a method for detecting cobalamin or folate deficiency.  
Deficiencies in these vitamins can cause serious illness, but are readily treated via 
supplements.  Claim 13 of the ’658 patent recites: 
13. A method of detecting a deficiency of cobalamin or folate in warm-
blooded animals comprising the steps of: 
assaying a body fluid for an elevated level of total homocysteine; and 
correlating an elevated level of total homocysteine in said body fluid 
with a deficiency of cobalamin or folate.75
¶29 It should be appreciated that physicians have long tested blood for levels of 
homocysteine.  The patentable advance of the ’658 patent concerns the second, 
“correlating” step of claim 13.  Arguably, this step merely claims the scientific discovery 
that elevated levels of homocysteine in the blood tend to demonstrate a deficiency in 
cobalamin or folate. 
¶30 Metabolite brought suit against LabCorp for infringement of the ’658 patent.  
Metabolite ultimately prevailed, obtaining over two million dollars in damages.  On 
appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment of infringement, in part upholding the 
’658 patent over LabCorp’s assertions of its failure to satisfy the anticipation, 
obviousness, definiteness, written description, and enablement requirements.76  The issue 
of statutory subject matter was not discussed in any respect within the court of appeals 
opinion. 
¶31 In late 2004, LabCorp petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.77  The 
Supreme Court responded by requesting the government to file a brief on one of the 
questions posed by LabCorp.  As the Supreme Court framed the question: 
 
70 See Diehr, 450 U.S. at 191-92; Parker, 437 U.S. at 590. 
71 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373 (1996) (emphasis added). 
72 Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 
546 U.S. 975 (2005), and cert. dismissed, 126 U.S. 2921 (2006). 
73 Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
74 Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S.Ct. 2921 (2006). 
75 Id. at 2924. 
76 Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1365-69 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
77 Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004), petition for 
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Respondent’s patent claims a method for detecting a form of vitamin B 
deficiency, which focuses upon a correlation in the human body between 
elevated levels of certain amino acids and deficient levels of vitamin B.  The 
method consists of the following: First, measure the level of the relevant amino 
acids using any device, whether the device is, or is not patented; second, notice 
whether the amino acid level is elevated and, if so, conclude that a vitamin B 
deficiency exists.  Is the patent invalid because one cannot patent “laws of nature, 
natural phenomenon, and abstract ideas?”78
¶32 The Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari notwithstanding the 
government’s conclusion the Court should decline to review the case.  Certiorari was 
granted with respect to the following question: 
Whether a method patent setting forth an indefinite, undescribed, and non-
enabling step directing a party to “correlat[e]” results can validly claim a 
monopoly over a basic scientific relationship used in medical treatment such that 
any doctor necessarily infringes the patent merely by thinking about the 
relationship after looking at a test result.79
¶33 Although the Supreme Court presided over oral argument in the case, it ultimately 
denied the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.80  The strongly worded dissenting 
opinion of Justice Breyer (joined by Justices Stevens and Souter) remains of significance, 
however.81  These three Justices not only believed that the claimed invention was 
unpatentable because it recited a phenomenon of nature.  They additionally found it an 
easy case, no matter what the precise scope of the “phenomenon of nature” doctrine.  
Three Justices is, of course, just one short of the number needed to grant certiorari, and 
just two short of a majority of the Court.  In view of the Court’s renewed interest in the 
patent system, an appropriate case may well provoke a grant of certiorari on statutory 
subject matter in coming Terms. 
C. The Technological Contribution Standard 
¶34 A comprehensive understanding of subject matter patentability can be deduced 
directly from the Supreme Court’s precedent.  More specifically, patentable subject 
matter is restricted to inventions that involve technological contributions — namely, 
tangible products or processes that either (i) are tied to a particular machine or apparatus 
or (ii) cause transformation or reduction of an article to a different state or thing, and in 
either instance, produce technologically beneficial results.  The long-standing principles 
governing subject matter eligible for patenting should be maintained such that, for 
example, a method of painting a surface using the posterior of an infant (U.S. Pat. No. 
6,213,778) and a method for making jury selection determinations (U.S. Pat. No. 
 
cert. filed, 2004 U.S. Briefs 607, (U.S. Nov. 3, 2004) (No. 04-607). 
78 Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 543 U.S. 1185 (2005). 
79 Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 546 U.S. 975 (2005). 
80 Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S.Ct. 2921 (2006). 
81 Id. 
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6,607,389) are not patentable subject matter because they do not produce technologically-
beneficial results. 
¶35 In summarizing the Supreme Court’s existing standard, we recognize that the Court 
has used language suggesting that it may not be a definitive rule, but rather more akin to a 
presumption.82  In the intervening years, however, no situation has been presented to the 
Supreme Court to justify an exception to this standard.  This test sets forth a reasonable 
and balanced standard for subject matter eligibility. 
¶36 The requirement for technological contribution is also consistent with numerous 
cases of the Supreme Court, referring to patents as properly directed toward “technology” 
and “technological growth and industrial innovation.”83  We have not found any cases 
from the Supreme Court that are inconsistent with the technological contribution 
requirement.  Until recent years, lower courts had also recognized that patenting was 
confined to the “technological arts,” a modern term recognized as synonymous with the 
phrase “useful arts” as it appears in the Constitution.  84
¶37 This test is rooted in the constitutional requirement that patents are granted to 
promote the progress of useful arts.  In historical context, the useful arts required a 
technological contribution.  Supreme Court precedent reinforces the need for a 
technological contribution for patent eligibility.  A fair reading of controlling Supreme 
Court cases in the aggregate provides the foundation for the standard that a claim to a 
process or method is not patentable unless it either (i) is tied to a particular machine or 
apparatus or (ii) causes transformation or reduction of an article to a different state or 
thing, and in either instance produces technologically beneficial results. 
 
82 The Gottschalk Court stated: 
It is argued that a process patent must either be tied to a particular machine or apparatus 
or must operate to change articles or materials to a ‘different state or thing.’  We do not 
hold that no process could ever qualify if it did not meet the requirements of our prior 
precedents. 
Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972) (emphasis added).  However, the Supreme Court has not 
undertaken to define circumstances where a process outside its precedent would qualify for patent 
protection. 
83 See, e.g., Pfaff v. Wells, 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) (“[T]he patent system represents a carefully crafted 
bargain that encourages both the creation and the public disclosure of new and useful advances in 
technology, in return for an exclusive monopoly for a limited period of time.”) (emphasis added); Markman 
v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996) (“Congress created the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit as an exclusive appellate court for patent cases, H.R. Rep. No. 97-312, pp. 20-23 (1981), 
observing that increased uniformity would ‘strengthen the United States patent system in such a way as to 
foster technological growth and industrial innovation.’”) (emphasis added); Bonito Boats v. Thunder Craft 
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51 (1989) (same); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 184 (1981) (“Industrial 
processes . . . have historically been eligible to receive the protection of our patent laws.”) (emphasis 
added); Gottschalk, 409 U.S. at 64 (“The claims were not limited to any particular art or technology, to any 
particular apparatus or machinery, or to any particular end use.”) (emphasis added). 
84 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980); In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 959 (C.C.P.A. 1979) 
(“We have previously pointed out that the present day equivalent of the term ‘useful arts’ employed by the 
Founding Fathers is ‘technological arts.’”) (emphasis added), aff’d sub nom.; In re Waldbaum, 457 F.2d 
997, 1003 (C.C.P.A. 1979); In re Musgrave, 431 F.2d 882, 893 (C.C.P.A. 1970) (“All that is necessary, in 
our view, to make a sequence of operational steps a statutory ‘process’ within 35 U.S.C. § 101 is that it be 
in the technological arts so as to be in consonance with the Constitutional purpose to promote the progress 
of ‘useful arts.’”) (emphasis added). 
 162
Vol. 6:2] David J. Kappos et al. 
II. FEDERAL CIRCUIT DECISIONS HAVE APPLIED AN UNJUSTIFIABLY EXPANSIVE 
PATENT ELIGIBILITY STANDARD 
¶38 A specific, and particularly troubling, arena where Federal Circuit rulings diverge 
from the Supreme Court’s precedent is the eligibility of business methods for patenting.  
Historically, methods of doing business were not patentable subject matter and the 1952 
Patent Act did not change this principle.85  “Although the term ‘process’ was not added to 
35 U.S.C. § 101 until 1952, a process [as shaped by the Supreme Court’s precedent] has 
historically enjoyed patent protection because it was considered a form of ‘art’ as that 
term was used in the 1793 Act.”   In an oft-quoted comment, Judge Rich explained that: 86
Section 101, entitled “Inventions patentable,” enumerates the categories of 
inventions subject to patenting.  Of course, not every kind of an invention can be 
patented.  Invaluable though it may be to individuals, the public, and national 
defense, the invention of a more effective organization of the materials in, and 
the techniques of teaching a course in physics, chemistry, or Russian is not a 
patentable invention because it is outside of the enumerated [statutory] categorie . 
. . .  Also outside that group is one of the greatest inventions of our times, the 
diaper service.87
¶39 The dicta in the Federal Circuit decision in State Street, however, created a 
dramatic sea-change in the patentability of inchoate business methods.  State Street 
involved a patent generally directed to a data processing system for implementing an 
investment structure that was developed for use in Signature’s business as an 
administrator and accounting agent for mutual funds.   The district court invalidated the 88
 
85 See, e.g., Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Marzall, 180 F.2d 26, 27-28 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (method for testing 
beverages and like products to make advance determination of (Cont’d) consumer reactions and 
preferences not “new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or any new and useful improvements thereof”); 
Loew’s Drive-in Theatres, Inc. v. Park-In Theatres, Inc., 174 F.2d 547, 553 (1st Cir. 1949) (patent claiming 
arranging automobiles such that occupants would have an unobstructed view of a screen or stage did “not 
involve an exercise of the faculty of invention”); Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co., 160 F. 467, 
469-72 (2d Cir. 1908) (“cash-registering and account-checking” unpatentable “system of transacting 
business disconnected from the means for carrying out the system . . . .”); In re Patton, 127 F.2d 324, 327-
28 (C.C.P.A. 1942) (system of fighting fires using standardized and interchangeable firefighting equipment 
not patentable subject matter; “a system of transacting business, apart from the means for carrying out such 
system, is not within . . . [the patent statute] . . . nor is an abstract idea or theory, regardless of its 
importance or the ingenuity with which it was conceived, apart from the means for carrying such idea or 
theory into effect, patentable subject matter.”); In re Wait, 73 F.2d 982, 982-83 (C.C.P.A. 1934) (method of 
buying and selling stocks, wherein one party advertised offer, another party accepted offer and such 
transaction was recorded, constituted unpatentable method of doing business); In re Sterling, 70 F.2d 910, 
911-12 (C.C.P.A. 1934) (patent application directed to a particular arrangement of printed matter on bank 
checks and stubs not patentable subject matter); Ex Parte Turner, 1894 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 36, 36-37 
(method to secure reading of advertisements not patentable because, inter alia, process carried no physical 
effect; “a plan or theory of action which, if carried into practice, could produce no physical results 
proceeding direct from the operation of the theory or plan itself is not an art within the meaning of the 
patent laws.”); Ex Parte Abraham, 1869 Dec. Comm’r Pat. 59 (method for detecting and preventing tax 
evasion by employing stamps to be severed upon attachment to an article unpatentable; “[i]t is contrary . . . 
to the spirit of the law . . . to grant patents for methods of book-keeping . . . .”). 
86 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 182 (citing Corning v. Burden, 15 How. 267-68, 252, 14 L.Ed. 683 (1854)). 
87 Giles S. Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 393, 393-94 (1960).  Judge Rich 
was one of the principal drafters of the 1952 Patent Act as well as a Judge of the Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit from 1957 to 1999. 
88 State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
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patent for failure to claim statutory subject matter under § 101.89  The Federal Circuit 
reversed the district court, ruling that the claims were directed to patentable subject 
matter because they produced a “useful, concrete and tangible result”:  90
[T]he transformation of data, representing discrete dollar amounts, by a machine 
through a series of mathematical calculations into a final share price, constitutes 
a practical application of a mathematical algorithm, formula, or calculation, 
because it produces “a useful, concrete and tangible result” — a final share price 
momentarily fixed for recording and reporting purposes and even accepted and 
relied upon by regulatory authorities and in subsequent trades.91
¶40 Furthermore, although State Street quotes from Diehr that “anything under the sun 
made by man is patentable,” that quote was taken out of context.92  Congressional reports 
employed that phrase only with respect to machines and manufactures.93  Certainly, § 101 
does not say “anything under the sun made by man” is patentable subject matter, but 
rather references four specific categories. 
¶41 While the Federal Circuit’s holding in State Street regarding the claim at issue can 
be justified, we believe that dicta in the decision ignited the explosion of non-
technological business method patents seen today.  The Federal Circuit concluded that 
the claim was drawn to a system, not a method of doing business, and it included a 
number of structural elements as limitations — thus, the claimed invention was a 
machine that implemented a process.  However, the expansive dicta in State Street are 
inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s precedent.  94
¶42 Acquiescing to the demands of patent applicants and responding to the State Street 
dicta, the USPTO dramatically changed course.  Thus, for example, the USPTO 
promulgated “interim guidelines” stating that an invention need not lie within the 
“technological arts” to be patented.95  Issued patents from such diverse areas as 
architecture, athletics, insurance, painting, psychology, and the law itself, reveal just how 
far afield the patent system has gone in granting patents in virtually any area of human 
endeavor, such as teaching a golf putting stroke or a method for lifting a box.  96
 
89 Id.  
90 Id. at 1375. 
91 Id. at 1373.  
92 Id. 
93 See S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 2399 (1952) (“A person may have ‘invented’ a machine or a manufacture, 
which may include anything under the sun that is made by man, but it is not necessarily patentable under 
section 101 unless the conditions of the title are fulfilled.”); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923 (1952) (same). 
94 See, e.g., State Street, 149 F.3d at 1375 (“We take this opportunity to lay this ill-conceived exception 
[i.e., that business methods are not patentable] to rest.”). 
95 Official Gazette of the U. S. Pat. & Trademark Off., 1300 O.G. 142, No. 4 (Nov. 22, 2005). In 
reaction to the sweeping impact of State Street, Congress passed the First Inventor Defense Act of 1999, 
i.e., 35 U.S.C. § 273, to provide a defense to infringement of a business method patent if the accused 
infringer “had, acting in good faith, actually reduced the subject matter to practice at least 1 year before the 
effective filing date of such patent, and commercially used the subject matter before the effective filing date 
of such patent.” First Inventor Defense Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1536 (codified as 
amended at 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2000)). Beyond that limited purpose, there is nothing in the legislative history 
to suggest Congress intended to make any other changes to the United States patent laws. Thus, the 
Supreme Court’s precedent on section 101 patent eligibility for business methods — as articulated in the 
Gottschalk-Parker-Diehr trilogy — remains the controlling standard.  
96 See, e.g., Method For Demonstrating a Lifting Technique, U.S. Patent No. 5,498,162 (filed Sept. 6, 
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¶43 In the context of business methods, the broad dicta in State Street reduced the 
historically separate subject matter requirement of § 101 to a mere “practical utility” 
determination.97  The contrast in approach is clearly evident from the Supreme Court’s 
precedent.  In Parker v. Flook, for example, the case turned “entirely on the proper 
construction of § 101 of the Patent Act, which describes the subject matter that is eligible 
for patent protection.”98  Whether subject matter is eligible for patenting is an entirely 
separate inquiry from whether the claimed invention provides some useful result, i.e., 
whether it meets the separate utility requirement of § 101.  99
¶44 No decision of the Supreme Court supports the broad proposition that merely 
because a method yields a useful result it should ipso facto be eligible for patenting.  
Rather, the Supreme Court has recognized that the utility requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 101 
is a distinct and separate test from the eligibility requirement of § 101.  A mere “useful 
result” standard is much too lenient to determine whether subject matter is eligible for 
patenting.  As Judge Rich so aptly stated decades ago, the diaper service (prior to the 
advent of disposable diapers) was undoubtedly one of the greatest business creations in 
its day, invaluable to countless individuals.  However, despite its usefulness, the diaper 
service does not fall within one of the four enumerated categories of § 101.  100
¶45 In his dissent from the Supreme Court’s dismissal of the writ of certiorari in 
Metabolite as improvidently granted,101 Justice Breyer recognized as much.  Identifying 
this inconsistency between the Court’s precedent and that of the Federal Circuit, Justice 
Breyer explained that the Supreme Court had never equated patentable subject matter 
with mere utility.  He further identified three cases where the Court held a claimed 
invention to constitute unpatentable subject matter despite the fact it had achieved a 
useful, concrete, and tangible result.  102
¶46 Although only two Justices joined with Justice Breyer in his dissenting opinion, his 
observations had no direct impact upon the law of patent eligibility.  They appear to have 
been keenly felt nonetheless.  Possibly influenced by Justice Breyer’s dissent from the 
dismissal of certiorari in Metabolite, the Federal Circuit recently issued two decisions 
that revisited, and essentially revised, the holding of State Street.  In In re Nuijten,103 and 
In re Comiskey,104 the Federal Circuit imposed restrictions on the broad scope of 
patentable subject matter it first announced in State Street. 
 
1994), Method and Apparatus for Improving Putting Skill, U.S. Patent No. 6,447,403 (filed Sept. 11, 2000), 
Methods of Exchanging an Obligation, U.S. Patent No. 6,912,510 (filed May 9, 2000), Character 
Assessment Method, U.S. Patent No. 5,190,458 (filed Apr. 17, 1991), and Method and Apparatus For 
Funding Education By Acquiring Shares of Students Future Earnings, U.S. Patent No. 5,809,484 (filed 
May 24, 1995). 
97 State Street, 149 F.3d at 1375 (“The question of whether a claim encompasses statutory subject matter 
should not focus on which of the four categories of subject matter a claim is directed to — process, 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter — but rather on the essential characteristics of the subject 
matter, in particular, its practical utility.”) (emphasis added). 
98 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588 (1978).  
99 See id. 
100 See Rich, supra note 87, at 393. 
101 Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S.Ct. 2921  (2006). 
102 Justice Breyer identified O’Reilly v. Morse, Gottshalk v. Benson, and Parker v. Flook as involving 
claimed inventions that achieved useful, concrete, and tangible results that nonetheless were held not to be 
patentable subject matter. 
103 In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
104 In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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¶47 In In re Nuitjen,105 the Court of Appeals concluded that claims directed toward 
transitory electrical and electromagnetic signals propagated through a medium were not 
encompassed with any of the categories of statutory subject matter.  Judge Gajarsa took 
pains to note that State Street should not be read to hold that the four subject matter 
categories were “rendered irrelevant, non-limiting, or subsumed into an overarching 
question about patentable utility.”106  According to Nuitjen, the statutory subject matter 
inquiry required a careful review into whether the claimed invention could be fairly 
identified as a process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.107  If the claimed 
invention did not fall into at least one of those categories, it was not patentable, whether 
or not it achieved a useful result. 
¶48 In a second opinion, In re Comiskey,108 the Federal Circuit ruled that claims 
directed solely towards a “method for mandatory arbitration resolution regarding one or 
more unilateral documents” also did not comprise patentable subject matter.  Upon 
reviewing the Supreme Court opinions, Judge Dyk reasoned that the prohibition against 
patenting abstract ideas incorporated two aspects.109  First, he explained, abstract ideas 
that lack a practical application are unpatentable.  Even if an abstract idea may be put to 
practical use, however, the idea may only be patented if “it is embodied in, operates on, 
transforms, or otherwise involves another class of statutory subject matter, i.e., a 
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”110  The Federal Circuit concluded that 
controlling precedent held “that the application of human intelligence to solve practical 
problems is not in and of itself patentable.”  111
¶49 Applying these standards to the case before it, the Comiskey court held that claims 
directed towards the “mental process of resolving a legal dispute between two parties by 
the decision of a human arbitrator” were not patentable.  Because such claims sought to 
patent the “use of human intelligence in and of itself,” they were held to be 
unpatentable.112  However, the Federal Circuit determined that other claims calling for a 
computer implementation of the arbitration method were considered patentable subject 
matter.  According to the Federal Circuit, “these claims in combining the use of machines 
with a mental process, claim patentable subject matter.”113  As a result, the Court of 
Appeals remanded the matter to the USPTO to determine whether the computer-
implemented claims would have been obvious. 
¶50 Nuijten and Comiskey took steps towards reconciling Federal Circuit standards with 
controlling Supreme Court precedent.  In our view, however, these two decisions do not 
fully reconcile the case law of the Court of Appeals with that of the Supreme Court.  In 
particular, the Federal Circuit still considers computer-implemented methods to constitute 
patentable subject matter, no matter what the nature of the method or the outcome it 
achieves.  We know of no Supreme Court opinion that allows patents to issue on 
computer-implemented methods where essential features of a claimed invention are not 
 
105 In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1369. 
106 Id. at 1354. 
107 Id. 
108 In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d at 1381. 
109 Id. at 1376. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. at 1378. 
112 Id. at 1379. 
113 Id. at 1380. 
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technological.  In particular, the Court’s latest statement concerning patentable subject 
matter, Diamond v. Diehr, emphasized that the claimed mathematical algorithm was put 
to use in curing rubber, an industrial process that had long been subject to patenting.114  
This invention could not contrast more strongly with the invention in Comiskey, where 
the claimed method resulted in the resolution of legal disputes. 
¶51 The distinction between Diehr and Comiskey is significant.  Given the ubiquity of 
computers and other enabling technologies in modern life, a rule by which unpatentable 
subject matter is transformed into a patentable invention by coupling it with a machine 
significantly dilutes the practical import of statutory subject matter limitations within the 
patent law.  Under the Comiskey rule, the patent drafter need merely claim an invention 
in terms of a “system” or “machine” for accomplishing a particular method.  The 
Comiskey rule is one of mere formality, for such drafting techniques qualify otherwise 
unpatentable methods as statutory subject matter, yet place few practical limitations upon 
the scope of the claims.  In such a world, the policy rationales supporting limits on the 
scope of patentable subject matter are poorly served. 
¶52 It is easy to imagine, for example, patents upon all manner of artistic methods 
implemented using computers or cameras, or even painting or sculpting clay.  The results 
of such aesthetic methods have long been the subject of protection via copyright, rather 
than patents.  They are traditionally classified as fine, rather than useful arts, and they are 
not amenable to the objective analyses that patenting standards such as novelty, 
nonobviousness, enablement, and claim definiteness require.115  In addition, the 
performance of such aesthetic methods relies upon human judgment rather than being 
repeatable in an industrial sense.  The scope of protection of such patents also raises 
significant concerns.  The enclosure of an entirely new art movement — such as cubism, 
impressionism, or even expressionism — through patenting seems entirely possible, for if 
such a movement can be articulated in words, it may be captured in a patent claim.  
Under the Comiskey rule, such aesthetic methods nonetheless can qualify as patent 
eligible subject matter if their claims call for the nominal use of a machine, manufacture, 
or composition of matter. 
¶53 Despite these shortcomings, Nuijten and Comiskey do take steps towards reviving 
patent eligibility principles which restore boundaries upon the scope of patent eligible 
subject matter to maintain both incentives to innovate and the ability to compete, and 
ultimately provide a sound balance between proprietary rights and preservation of the 
public domain.  Movements at the Federal Circuit have also been reflected at the USPTO 
where a number of decisions of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences have 
affirmed rejections based on non-statutory subject matter, including a method of hedging 
commodity consumption risk costs,116 a method of bringing new “startup” products to 
market,  and a method of evaluating an intangible asset.117 118  As these decisions are 
appealed to the Federal Circuit, and perhaps ultimately subject to consideration by the 
 
114 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
115 See Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (concluding that the 
claim limitation “aesthetically pleasing” was indefinite). 
116 Ex parte Bilski, No. 2002-2257 (Sept. 26, 2006). 
117 Ex parte Feguson, No. 2003-1044 (Aug. 27, 2004). 
118 Ex parte Bowman, No. 1999-0583 (June 12, 2001). 
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Supreme Court, further opportunities will exist to further define limitations on the scope 
of patentable subject matter. 
III. INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY CONCERNS RAISED BY 
BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS 
¶54 Not only is an unrestricted sense of patentable subject matter disfavored by sound 
innovation policy, it conflicts with the requirement, stipulated by the Constitution and 
consistently articulated by the Supreme Court’s precedent, that patentable subject matter 
must fall within the “useful arts.” Allowing methods of doing business lacking a technical 
contribution to be patent eligible subject matter raises important innovation and 
competition policy concerns.  119
A. Patent-Based Incentives are not Needed to Spur Business Method Innovation 
¶55 The decision to issue patents on particular subject matter involves, in the words of 
Thomas Jefferson, a determination of those “things which are worth to the public the 
embarrassment of an exclusive patent . . . .”120  In this regard, the evidence suggesting a 
sudden need for patent-based incentives to promote the development of business concepts 
is conspicuous by its absence.  “Nowhere in the substantial literature on innovation is 
there a statement that the United States economy suffers from a lack of innovation in 
methods of doing business.  Compared with the business practices of comparable 
economies we seem to be innovators . . . .”  121
¶56 Among the reasons for the persistent, favorable record of commercial 
entrepreneurship in the United States are existing federal and state regimes, including 
unfair competition law, trade secrets, copyright, and the misappropriation doctrine, that 
have long policed free riding and allowed business pioneers to reap the rewards of their 
ideas.122  In conjunction with market-based incentives, including the desire to seize first-
mover and learning-curve advantages, the current legal framework has resulted in a 
flourishing environment for business innovation in the United States.  No plausible 
argument supports the view that patent protection is needed for non-technological 
business methods to solve a market failure problem, fill a legal void, or ultimately 
enhance social welfare. 
B. Business Method Patenting Raises Significant Competitive Concerns 
¶57 Although no convincing justification exists for allowing patents on non-
technological methods of doing business and other abstract ideas, the breadth of coverage 
of such patents has raised significant competitive concerns.  Among them is that such 
patents are not restricted by the Constitution and the precedent articulated by the 
 
119 Examples of abstract business methods include U.S. Patent Nos. 5,947,526 (claim 1 reciting method 
for tracking personal expenditures) and 5,668,736 (claim 1 reciting method for remodeling an existing 
building). 
120 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966). 
121 Leo J. Raskind, The State Street Bank Decision: The Bad Business of Unlimited Patent Protection for 
Methods of Doing Business, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J., 61, 92 (1999). 
122 See id. at 93.  
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Supreme Court.  Rather, they may effectively appropriate all possible solutions to a 
particular problem.  This direct restraint upon the ability of competitors to develop 
alternatives to the patented invention thwarts a principal aspiration of the patent system 
— fostering new alternatives.  123
¶58 Consider, for example, the ubiquitous automated teller machine (ATM).  A review 
of the patent rolls reveals numerous ATM patents concerning such mechanical, electrical, 
and computer-implemented inventions as card readers, touch screens, cash dispensers, 
statement printers, and antitheft mechanisms.  As evidenced by the robust competition 
within the contemporary ATM industry, such patents have both preserved the incentives 
of industry participants to innovate and allowed their competitors to market alternative 
designs.  However, in view of the Federal Circuit’s endorsement of patents on inchoate 
business methods, a contemporary inventor’s claim to the very concept of an ATM would 
be considered eligible for patenting under § 101.  Much like claim 8 of Morse’s 
telegraphy patent, such a patent would effectively prevent all others from designing 
alternative mechanisms for meeting the same marketplace needs.  The potential adverse 
impact of this hypothetical patent upon competition not just in the ATM industry, but 
within the banking industry itself, is apparent. 
¶59 The lack of a plausible justification for patents on non-technological business 
methods and human behavior, coupled with the anticompetitive consequences of issuing 
these patents and the Supreme Court’s precedent in this area, counsels for reassertion of 
Supreme Court jurisprudence to restrict patentable subject matter to instantiated products 
and processes.  Modern society’s dizzying pace of technological change, with its 
accompanying changes to marketplace conditions and commercial practices, should by 
no means lead to an alteration of these established principles.  Nor does the Supreme 
Court’s recognition that the patent system should keep pace with unforeseeable fields of 
scientific or technological discovery124 compel a contrary result.  Business concepts are 
not an unforeseeable field, and in fact, they long predate the patent system.  125
¶60 In State Street, the Federal Circuit articulated broad-sweeping dicta without making 
an inquiry into whether the patenting of non-technological methods of doing business 
raises competitive concerns or whether traditional patent-based incentives were actually 
needed to spur methods of doing business.  “Jefferson saw clearly the difficulty in 
‘drawing a line between the things which are worth to the public the embarrassment of an 
exclusive patent, and those which are not.’”126  The ambit of patentable subject matter 
should return to that range of innovation that truly justifies tolerating the “embarrassment 
of an exclusive patent.” 
 
123 See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (“Until [a] process claim has been reduced to 
production of a product shown to be useful, the metes and bounds of that monopoly are not capable of 
precise delineation. It may engross a vast, unknown, and perhaps unknowable area.”); Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. 
Kinkead Indus., Inc., 932 F.2d 1453, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“Designing around patents is, in fact, one of 
the ways in which the patent system works to the advantage of the public in promoting progress in the 
useful arts, its constitutional purpose.”). 
124 See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 315-16. 
125 See, e.g., John R. Thomas, The Patenting of the Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139, 1145-46 
(1999). 
126 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 9 (1966). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
¶61 The gravamen of the Supreme Court’s precedent is that subject matter patentability 
is restricted to inventions that involve technological contributions, namely, tangible 
products or processes that either (i) are tied to a particular machine or apparatus or (ii) 
cause transformation or reduction of an article to a different state or thing, and in either 
instance, produce technologically-beneficial results.  In State Street, the Federal Circuit 
departed from this standard without any evidence that incentives are needed for 
innovation with respect to abstract business methods and other non-technological 
innovations, and without due consideration of the impact that such a shift would have on 
the economy.  Although more recent Federal Circuit cases have moved toward restoring 
controlling Supreme Court standards, their holdings continue to allow patents to issue on 
products and processes that achieve only non-technological results.  Consistent with the 
Supreme Court’s precedent on § 101, a technological contribution should be required for 
subject matter patentability, which would render non-technological business methods 
outside the scope of patentable subject matter. 
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